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Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21

Chad*

The present report is a summary of seven stakeholders’ submissions to the universal periodic review. It follows the general guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council in its decision 17/119. It does not contain any opinions, views or suggestions on the part of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), nor any judgement or determination in relation to specific claims. The information included herein has been systematically referenced in endnotes and, to the extent possible, the original texts have not been altered. As provided for in resolution 16/21 of the Human Rights Council, where appropriate, a separate section is provided for contributions by the national human rights institution of the State under review that is accredited in full compliance with the Paris Principles. The full texts of all submissions received are available on the OHCHR website. The report has been prepared taking into consideration the periodicity of the review and developments during that period.

* The present document was not edited before being sent to the United Nations translation services.
Information provided by stakeholders

A. Background and framework

1. Scope of international obligations

1. Amnesty International (AI) stated that Chad had not ratified a single one of the eight international human rights instruments that it had agreed to ratify during its first review. Chad did sign some of them in late 2012, including the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; however, these still have to be ratified.\(^2\)

2. The International Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture and Christian Action for the Abolition of Torture (JS1) stated that, of all the recommendations made to Chad, priority should be given to the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment so that conditions of detention may be improved for persons deprived of their liberty. JS1 noted however, that the State’s signature of the Optional Protocol on 26 September 2012 is a first step that should be applauded.\(^3\)

3. JS1 recommended that Chad ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.\(^4\)

4. JS1 also recommended that Chad ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.\(^5\)

2. Constitutional and legislative framework

5. AI noted that in January 2013, the Chadian Parliament passed a law that amended the Constitution. This law allows the President to transfer Supreme Court judges without their prior consent and the President can cumulate (combine) his own position and function with other leadership functions thereby blurring the separation of powers.\(^6\)

6. JS1 pointed out that a technical committee has been established with a view to incorporating the provisions of the conventions and treaties ratified by Chad into its laws.\(^7\)

7. JS1 noted that, although Chad has acceded to the Convention against Torture and article 18 of the Chadian Constitution provides that: “No person may be subjected to degrading or humiliating abuse or treatment or torture”, there is still no definition of torture in the Criminal Code. JS1 asserted that torture is mentioned in only one article of the Code, where it figures only as an aggravating circumstance, and that it is not itself classified as an offence. Recalling that in 2009 the Government of Chad had made a commitment to incorporate article 1 of the Convention against Torture into its legislation, JS1 emphasized that doing so should make it possible to prevent acts of torture and ill-treatment and to punish them effectively.\(^8\)

8. JS1 recommended that Chad introduce a definition of torture into national law that is in line with article 1 of the Convention and that it include sanctions in the Criminal Code that are commensurate with the seriousness of the acts in question. JS1 also recommended that Chad incorporate the principle of the absolute prohibition of torture into its criminal legislation. In accordance with this principle, no exceptional circumstance whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for torture.\(^9\)
9. In addition, JSI recommended that Chad take the necessary measures to adopt the revised Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure in order to guarantee, in particular, the fundamental procedural rights of persons deprived of liberty from the moment of their arrest.10

10. Child Soldiers International (CSI) mentioned that Chad was required to adopt a legislation to implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which it had ratified in November 2006, including by establishing as a war crime the recruitment of children and their use to participate actively in hostilities.11

11. CSI reminded that in 2011, the Government had signed an United Nations Action Plan on children associated with armed forces and groups in Chad committing, among others, to end the recruitment and use of under-18s by the national army and armed groups; facilitate the release of child soldiers and their temporary care, recovery and reintegration and criminalise the recruitment and use of children in national law.12

12. CSI noted that the 2006 Law on the Reorganisation of Armed and Security Forces, which sets the minimum age for enrolment (voluntary) in the army at 18 and the minimum age for conscription (compulsory) at 20, had not fully enforced.13 It added that the draft Child Protection Code prepared by the Ministry of Justice with the support of UNICEF, which includes a provision imposing criminal sanctions for the acts of recruiting and using children in hostilities, was currently awaiting debate in Parliament, but had been fraught with delays and difficulties since 2007. CSI recommended that Chad Criminalise the recruitment of under-18s and their use in hostilities.14

13. The Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children (GIEACPC) noted that national laws were being reviewed with a view to harmonisation with international standards. Since the initial Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a number of draft laws had been under discussion, including a draft Family Code, a draft Child Protection Code and draft amendments to the Criminal Code but discussion had stalled due to pressure from religious groups.15

3. Institutional and human rights infrastructure and policy measures

14. AI stated that the mandate of the Chadian National Human Rights Commission was unclear in terms of its role and that of the Ministry of Human Rights, and it thus failed short of the Paris Principles.16

B. Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

1. Cooperation with treaty bodies

15. CSI recommended that Chad draft, without delay and in consultation with relevant Ministries and NGOs, its initial Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child.17

2. Cooperation with special procedures

N/A.

3. Cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

16. CSI noticed that in December 2011, a committee for Treaty Body reporting, comprised of representatives from most Ministries, had been established by Prime Minister Decree and that, in early December 2012, it had received training from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.18
C. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

1. Right to life, liberty and security of the person

17. AI stated that despite commitments made during the last review to bring to justice those responsible for human rights abuses including enforced disappearances, no effective action had been taken by the authorities to bring to justice those suspected of responsibility for the disappearances, including that of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh whose fate remained unknown. Furthermore, AI added that despite their commitments, the authorities had failed to disclose the fate of at least 14 army officers arrested in N’Djamena in April 2006 on suspicion of involvement in a 2006 attack on N’Djamena and that of six members of the Tama ethnic group arrested in Guéréda (north-eastern Chad) in November 2007.19

18. AI recommended that Chad publicly disclose the whereabouts of individuals who had disappeared in N’Djamena in April 2006, in Dar Tama in November 2007 and in N’Djamena in February 2008, including opposition leader Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh. It also recommended that Chad launch independent investigations into the cases of individuals who had died or had disappeared while in the custody of the security forces, initiate prosecutions and bring to justice in trials that meet international fair trials standards those suspected of being responsible for enforced disappearances as well as provide fair compensation to victims.20

19. Similarly, JS1 pointed out that the circumstances of the enforced disappearance of opposition leader Mr. Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, former President of the Coordination of Political Parties for the Defence of the Constitution (CPDC), who was arrested by security forces or by the Chadian army on 3 February 2008 at his home in N’Djamena and taken to an unknown place of detention, were still unclear and that his family had still not heard any news of him.21

20. JS1 recommended putting an end to the practice of enforced disappearances, closing down secret places of detention and providing information to families who have not heard from their loved ones since their arrest.22

21. AI stated that some detainees had died in custody due, among other things, to the harsh prison conditions. Security forces had on several occasions used deadly force to calm tensions or to tackle riots within the prisons. According to AI, in 2011, prison guards had killed at least seven prisoners in three separate incidents. On 17 September 2011, nine men had died of asphyxiation four hours after being detained at the National Gendarmerie in the town of Léré. Some of them had been subjected to ill-treatment during their arrest and a man, Bouba Hamane, died after his transfer to N’Djamena central prison. AI noted that no investigation into these deaths was known to have been initiated by the end of 2012. It also stated that the police, the gendarmerie and members of the National Security Agency (Agence Nationale de Sécurité, ANS) regularly tortured suspects, sometimes with the involvement of local administrative authorities.23

22. AI recommended that Chad conduct prompt, independent and impartial investigation into all allegations of torture and other ill-treatment of people detained in prisons, police and security service cells, and ensure that those found responsible were brought to justice in accordance with international obligations and fair trial standards. It also recommended suspending from duty officials who order or condone such crimes regardless of their rank, pending an impartial and independent criminal investigation.24

23. JS1 stated that torture is a common practice in district police stations and in gendarmeries. According to various NGO reports based on numerous accounts, the abuses
are committed mainly by law enforcement officers (police officers, gendarmes and soldiers), and thus far officials have rarely been prosecuted for these acts. 25

24. JSI recommended adopting measures to ensure that all allegations of torture and ill-treatment are promptly, impartially and effectively investigated and that those responsible, regardless of whether or not they are law enforcement officers, are prosecuted and punished. It also stated that investigations should be conducted by an independent body. 26

25. AI noted that there had been little progress in implementing the Action Plan on children associated with armed forces and groups. 27 According to AI, both the army and armed groups continued to recruit and use child soldiers and at least 36 children were recruited to the National Army (Armée Nationale du Tchad, ANT) in 2012. 28 AI added that rebel leader Abdel Kader Baba Laddé of the Popular Front for Redress had been appointed Special Adviser to the Chadian Prime Minister in January 2013, despite accusations that he had been involved in the recruitment of child soldiers in both Chad and the Central African Republic. 29 The Center for Human Rights (CHR) stated the children from internally displaced families were particularly at risk of recruitment by armed groups and militia. 30

26. AI recommended that Chad send clear orders to all commanders to immediately stop the recruitment, re-recruitment and use of children under the age of 18, release all children currently enlisted, and fully cooperate with UNICEF and other actors involved in the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers. 31 It also recommended ensuring the full implementation of the Action Plan signed by the Chadian Government and the United Nations and taking action against commanders who failed to comply with it. 32

27. While acknowledging some political will from the authorities to end underage recruitment, CSI underlined that enforcement measures had not been taken. 33 It also noted that the ban on child recruitment remained difficult to enforce because of low birth registration rates, as a result of which most candidates to recruitment did not have birth certificates or other proof of age. However, recruiting agents had not received any instructions or child protection training prior to the 2012 recruitment campaign, and age verification methods used were flawed. 34 According to CSI, military instructions were issued in September 2012 after children had been officially enlisted and following pressure from the international community. 35

28. CSI recommended that Chad take measures to make birth registration free and compulsory in practice; instruct recruiters that in case of doubt over an individual’s age they should not be recruited and that, in the absence of a birth certificate, temporary alternative measures of age verification should be used. It also recommended, among others, inviting UN and NGO child protection experts to monitor recruitment; granting the UN and other child protection agencies, ongoing and unimpeded access to all military facilities and other locations where child recruits may be present; investigating all credible allegations of child recruitment or use and ensuring that appropriate disciplinary sanctions were imposed on military officials found responsible. 36

29. Regarding demobilisation, temporary care and reunification of child soldiers (DDR), CSI highlighted that although the authorities had been prompt to release underage recruits in 2012, very few had been entrusted to child protection actors, and most had been simply sent home. Following the closure of the 2007–2011 national child DDR programme, the Government was unprepared to care for children demobilised in 2012. 37

30. CSI recommended that Chad resume, with the support of the UN, the national child DDR programme, and ensure that it is adequately funded and regularly and independently monitored as well as take immediate steps, in collaboration with the UN, to identify and provide assistance to all demobilised child soldiers. 38
31. GIEACPC noted that in the absence of a law reform, the legality of corporal punishment of children in Chad was the same today as in 2009: lawful in the home, penal institutions and alternative care settings. It stated that at home, corporal punishment was not explicitly prohibited in law and provisions against violence and abuse in the Penal Code. It added that at school, corporal punishment was unlawful but in alternative care settings, there was no explicit prohibition. Regarding the penal system, GIEACPC explained that corporal punishment was unlawful as a sentence for crime but there was no explicit prohibition of corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure in penal institutions.

32. GIEACPC recommended that Chad enact a legislation to explicitly prohibit corporal punishment of children in all settings, including in the home, as a matter of priority.

33. AI stated that the authorities had failed to prevent and address sexual violence by both state and non-state agents since the 2009 UPR and that rape and other violence against women and girls remained widespread. It noted that internally displaced Chadians, refugees, as well as local women and children, were among the victims. AI added that cases were underreported, including for fear of reprisals from the perpetrators who were often members of their communities, armed groups or the security forces. According to AI, other forms of violence against women and girls also continue, including female genital mutilation and forced marriage imposed on girls as young as 13, including in refugee camps and Internal Displaced Persons (IDP) sites.

34. AI recommended that Chad ensure that woman and girl victims of rape and other violence receive adequate medical and psychological assistance and that women and girls are effectively protected from all forms of violence, including female genital mutilation, early or forced marriage, domestic violence and sexual abuse.

35. CHR stated that in most cases the recommendations pertaining to violence against women made during the first UPR were either not implemented or partially implemented. It added that the levels of gender based violence were still extremely high especially in the eastern part of the country which had a big number of women refugees as well as IDPs.

36. CHR noted that the existing lack of capacity, under resourcing as well as limited judicial independence meant that perpetrators of violence against women were almost never prosecuted and allowed for the undeterred continuation of violence.

37. AI noted that some of the security services, including the ANS, often illegally arrested and detained people. It added that some people had been detained by the police and gendarmerie for civil matters, contrary to provisions of the Constitution and national laws and some had been held incommunicado for prolonged periods of time.

38. AI noted that human rights defenders, including trade unionists and journalists, were often attacked or subjected to intimidation and harassment by government officials, including the police. On 19 December 2011, Daniel Deuzoumbe Passalet, President of the Chadian organization Human Rights without Borders, was arrested in N’Djamena. In an interview with Radio France Internationale the previous day, he had expressed concern about impunity for the deaths of 10 men in the custody of the National Gendarmerie in Léré in September 2011. He was released on 30 December after the N’Djamena High Court sitting in Moussoro ruled that there was insufficient evidence to charge him.

39. AI stated that Government officials continued to intervene in the work of the judiciary and to use the criminal justice system to harass political opponents. In March 2012, opposition MP Gali Ngothé Gatta of the United Democratic Forces (Union des Forces Démocratiques) was arrested and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment for attempted corruption and poaching by the First Instance Tribunal in Sahr. He was tried and sentenced three days after his arrest, despite the fact that his parliamentary immunity had not been lifted. He was first held in Sahr prison and later transferred to Moundou prison.
following an appeal. On 24 April 2012, the Moundou Court of Appeal annulled the proceedings due to “grave flaws” and ordered his release. The Court of Appeal ruling was later confirmed by the Supreme Court.\(^5\)

40. AI recommended that Chad launch prompt and impartial investigations into all deaths in custody allegedly at the hands of security guards, including the deaths in custody of nine people in Léré in September 2011 and those shot dead by prison guards in Abéché, Borgor and Moussoro prisons in August, November and December 2011, respectively, and to suspend all accused persons from their duties while investigations are on-going.\(^6\)

41. AI recommended that Chad ensure that nobody was arbitrarily arrested or detained for exercising their right to freedom of expression or other rights, and that arrests were carried out by law enforcement officials in accordance with the law. It also recommended ensuring that detainees were brought before a court to have their detention legalised by a judge within 48 hours, in accordance with the law, or released. Finally, AI recommended that Chad guarantee that those who criticized the political system seek to hold peaceful anti-government protests, or created independent associations, were protected from any form of harassment or intimidation.\(^7\)

42. AI recommended that Chad allow human rights defenders to work freely, to ensure that action is taken to investigate all threats or attacks against them and to bring to justice those responsible for such acts in trials that meet international fair trial standards.\(^8\)

43. JS1 claimed that traditional authorities operate a parallel system of prisons where acts of torture are common; it also reported that secret prisons are used by some authorities (brigade commanders and others).\(^9\)

44. JS1 recommended facilitating access to detention centres for NGOs working in the field of human rights, family members and lawyers, raising awareness among all individuals working with persons deprived of their liberty and providing those individuals with training on a systematic basis. JS1 also recommended that prison authorities should make sure that prison registers are kept up to date as one means of helping to prevent illegal and abusive detentions and that the practice of maintaining a parallel system of secret prisons should be ended.\(^10\)

45. AI stated that most prisons were overcrowded and prisoners often had no access to adequate health services and other basic facilities and that men, women and children often shared facilities such as toilets, bath facilities, kitchen and courtyards. It also noted that due to the lack of security personnel, gang members participated, in some cases, in the management of security in the prison.\(^11\)

46. AI recommended that Chad ensure that all prisoners had access to basic rights, such as drinking water, basic health facilities and essential drugs, food, decent shelter and security of their person.\(^12\)

47. Regarding the recommendations made on the conditions of detention, CHR noted that some steps were undertaken especially in the legal reform sector including two ordinances on the Statute of the Penitentiary and Social Reinsertion Personnel that the President had signed in 2011. However, their implementation calls for sufficient resources and staff which are not readily available. The prison conditions continue to be very harsh and far below international standards.\(^13\)

48. JS1 noted that prison overcrowding in some gendarmeries or police stations remains at catastrophic levels and that living conditions for prisoners, particularly with regard to food, hygiene and sanitation, remains a major concern in most jails.\(^14\)
2. Administration of justice, including impunity and the rule of law

49. JSI emphasized that the judicial system in Chad is wrought with problems, such as the judiciary’s lack of independence from the executive branch, a lack of training, a lack of human and material resources, corruption and the fact that some judges felt unsafe. JSI was of the view that Chad should provide appropriate training for all staff of the judicial system, remedy the shortage of judges and ensure that all courts have professional judges assigned to them.60

50. JSI recalled that, during the first cycle of the universal periodic review, Chad had agreed to follow up without delay on all the recommendations made by the National Commission of Enquiry established on 2 April 2008, to provide all the necessary information on the events that occurred in N’Djamena between 28 January and 8 February 2008, and to bring to justice those believed to be responsible for these events.61

51. JSI stated that the absence of a definition of torture in the Criminal Code and the fact that torture is not a criminal offence pave the way for impunity for perpetrators of torture. JSI noted that alleged perpetrators of acts of torture continue to enjoy complete impunity.62 For example, the alleged perpetrators of or accomplices to torture under the regime of Mr. Hissen Habré still live in absolute freedom, still occupy senior decision-making positions and have not been troubled in any way, while their victims suffer from the after-effects of torture or die from it without receiving any redress.63

52. Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that despite the Truth Commission recommendations, Hissen Habré’s former accomplices continued to enjoy impunity for their acts.64 According to HRW, many agents of the Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité (DDS), the political police of the former President, remained in security and administration positions.65

53. HRW explained that in 2000, 17 victims had lodged criminal complaints for torture, murder, and “disappearance” against named members of the DDS and that the investigation had begun in May 2001, after which dozens of other victims came forward to file their complaints against their direct torturers. HRW noted that the Chadian investigating judge had repeatedly stated that he needed additional funding and personal protection if he was to carry out an investigation against the DDS’ powerful former figures, but over 10 years later, the Chadian Government had provided neither financial aid nor security measures in order him to carry out his work in proper conditions. HRW noted that the presence of these former DDS leaders intimidated victims and human rights defenders and in some cases facilitated attacks on them, creating obstacles to restoring the rule of law in Chad.66

54. HRW recommended that Chad remove all former high-level Habré-era security agents from security posts; declare publicly that it would not tolerate any intimidation against those seeking redress and justice in the courts and give full support to the Chadian justice system in its handling of the cases against former DDS agents.67

55. HRW also underlined that to this day, neither material nor moral reparations had been granted to Habré’s victims. It recommended that Chad, in order to honour the memory of those victims and to educate Chadian society, implement the recommendations of the Truth Commission and “construct a monument honouring the memory of the victims of Habré’s repression,” “designate a day for prayer and contemplation for said victims,” and “transform the former DDS headquarters and underground prison known as the ‘Piscine’ into a museum.”68 HRW also recommended providing financial compensation to each victim or family or create an assistance fund in order to redress the violations committed by the agents of the Chadian state.69

56. HRW highlighted that the victims were still waiting for their suffering and the ordeals that they or their families had gone through to be recognized by Chadian society.
As a complement to the prosecution of the former President and his accomplices, recognition of these atrocities would have tremendous beneficial effects on national reconciliation.\textsuperscript{70}

3. Freedom of religion or belief, expression, association and peaceful assembly and right to participate in public and political life

57. Reporters without Borders (RSF) stated that even though the Chad’s Constitution guaranteed media freedom, in practice the tight political control exercised by President Idriss Déby, the Ministers and the judicial officials limited the possibilities of expressing critical views. According to RSF, President Déby is very hostile towards opposition and independent media.\textsuperscript{71}

58. RSF noted that since August 2010, the media law had been more supple but not less repressive than the one before. This law abolished prison sentences for defamation and insult but maintained exorbitant fines and allowed newspapers to be suspended for up to three years. RSF highlighted that “Inciting tribal, racial or religious hatred” carried a possible sentence of one to two years in prison and a fine of 1 to 3 million CFA francs (1,500 to 4,500 euros). It added that in 2012, Jean-Claude Nékim, the editor of the opposition newspaper N’Djamena Bi-Hebo, had been given a one-year suspended jail sentence and his newspaper had been suspended for three months over a brief about a petition referring to the social crisis in Chad and condemning bad governance.\textsuperscript{72}

59. RSF declared that abduction, kidnap attempts, harassment and threats sustained a climate of danger and fear. For example, the young reporter Adam Ali Adam was kidnapped in December 2012 after being threatened a few times. RSF also that self-censorship was increasing and many journalists had chosen to go into exile.\textsuperscript{73}

60. RSF noted that a proposed revision of the media law had been in discussion since November 2012 and could mean the death of the independent press. It highlighted that the section 9 of the draft which stated that every journalist was required to possess a master’s diploma from a school of journalism, or a university degree plus vocational training at a state-approved school of journalism would exclude key figures in several influential local newspapers such as N’Djamena Bi-Hebo, Notre Temps and Le Potentiel. It added that the draft provided for prison sentences for journalists from five months to 10 years, higher fines, extension of temporary closures from three months to a year and possible imposition by a court of an indefinite publication ban. RSF declared that if this bill was approved, it would set press freedom in Chad back 40 years.\textsuperscript{74}

61. RSF recommended that Chad implement all recommendations accepted during its first UPR in 2009, and give some clear commitments on the on-going/pending issues as well as reject the revision of the media law.\textsuperscript{75}

62. Stating that the authorities regularly threaten and harass journalists, AI recommended that Chad respect and uphold the right to freedom of expression and protect journalists, human rights defenders and political opponents against harassment and intimidation for exercising their human rights; refrain from using the judiciary to intimidate and harass journalists and repeal provisions of the new proposed media law that could violate freedom of expression and press freedom.\textsuperscript{76}

63. With regards to the recommendations made for the repeal of the press law and for the establishment of legislative framework to protect journalists and human rights defenders, CHR stated that there had been little progress towards implementing the same. It mentioned that there had been efforts to revise the media laws, but if the proposed legislation passed, it would lead to the loss of media freedom in Chad. It added that stakeholders were concerned that the proposed legislation, drafted without stakeholder
consultations and participation and in a manner lacking transparency would sound a death knell for media independence.\textsuperscript{77}

64. AI recommended that Chad stop using the judiciary as a tool to silence dissent by trade unionists, journalists and other political opponents; guarantee that those who criticize the political system and the authorities are protected from any form of harassment or intimidation and can carry out their work without fear of persecution.\textsuperscript{78}

4. **Right to social security and to an adequate standard of living**

65. AI noted that following a presidential decree in 2008, forced evictions continued to take place in N’Djamena, affecting thousands of people. According to AI, these evictions are conducted without due process, adequate notice or consultation, and in some cases those who have lost their homes have not received alternative housing or other form of compensation despite court orders.\textsuperscript{79}

66. AI recommended that Chad cease the forced eviction of people in N’Djamena and conduct a full, independent and impartial enquiry into the role of police and military in forced evictions; hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations in the context of forced evictions and pass and enforce a law prohibiting forced evictions as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{80}

**Notes**

1 The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org.

*Civil society*

JS1 Fédération internationale de l’Action des Chrétiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture, Paris; France, et Action des Chrétiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture, Tchad

AI Amnesty International, London, UK

CHR Center for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa

CSI Child Soldiers International, London, UK

GIEACPC Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children

HRW Human Rights Watch, New York, USA

RSF Reporters sans frontières – Reporters Without Borders

2 AI, p. 1.

3 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 3.

4 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 8.

5 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 8.

6 AI, p. 1.

7 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 4.

8 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 3.

9 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 4.

10 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 5.

11 CSI, para. 5, p. 2.

12 CSI, para. 7, p. 2.

13 CSI, para. 8, p. 2.

14 CSI, para. 9, p. 3.

15 GIEACPC, para. 1.2, p. 2.

16 AI, pp. 1–2.

17 CSI, p. 3.

18 CSI, para. 11, p. 3.

19 AI, p. 2.

20 AI, p. 4.

21 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 7.
22 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 8.
23 AI, pp. 2–3.
24 AI, p. 4.
25 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 3–4.
26 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 5.
27 See also FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 7.
28 See also CSI, para. 12, pp. 3–4.
29 AI, p. 2.
30 CHR, para. 4, pp. 1–2.
31 See also FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 6.
32 AI, p. 4.
33 CSI, para. 13, p. 4.
34 CSI, para. 15, p. 4.
35 CSI, para. 14, p. 4.
36 CSI, pp. 4–5.
37 CSI, paras 18 and 19, p. 5.
38 CSI, p. 5.
39 GIEACPC, para. 1.3, p. 2.
40 GIEACPC, para. 2.1, p. 2.
41 GIEACPC, para. 2.2, p. 2.
42 GIEACPC, para. 2.3, p. 2.
43 GIEACPC, p. 1.
44 AI, p. 2.
45 AI, p. 4.
46 CHR, p. 1.
48 AI, p. 3.
49 AI, p. 3.
50 AI, p. 4.
51 AI, p. 5.
52 AI, pp. 4–5.
53 AI, p. 5.
54 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 5.
55 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 5.
56 AI, p. 2.
57 AI, p. 5.
58 CHR, para. 7, p. 2.
59 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 5.
60 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 4.
61 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 5.
62 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 5.
63 FIACAT and ACAT Tchad, p. 2.
64 HRW, p. 1.
65 HRW, p. 2.
66 HRW, p. 2.
67 HRW, p. 4.
68 HRW, p. 3.
69 HRW, p. 4.
70 HRW, p. 4.
71 RSF, p. 2.
72 RSF, p. 2. See also AI, p. 3.
73 RSF, p. 3.
74 RSF, p. 3.
75 RSF, p. 3.
76 AI, p. 5.
77 CHR, para. 10, p. 3.
78 AI, p. 5
79 AI, p. 3.
80 AI, p. 5.